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1. Introduction 
The matter of the ‘original sin’ came to the centre of the academic 
discussion after the dramatic episodes in Asia, Russia and Latin America (Mexican 
crisis in 1994, the Asian crisis in 1997, the Russian crisis in 1998, the Brazilian 
crisis in 1999, the Argentinean crisis in 2002), when the depreciation of local 
currency together with the denomination of debt in foreign currency – the dollar – 
resulted in currency, banking and financial crisis. 
In this context, Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) define ‘original sin’ as 
the “inability to borrow abroad in terms of domestic currency and to borrow 
domestically long-term”. That implies, as stated by Panizza (2006), that ‘original 
sin’ is a two-dimensional phenomenon, characterized by an international 
component (the local currency of countries affected by ‘original sin’ cannot be 
used to borrow abroad) and by a domestic component (the local currency is not 
used domestically for long-term borrowing).In this sense and in line with the 
literature, we acknowledge that the need of obtaining foreign exchange reserves is 
intrinsically related with internal productive structures of countries suffering from 
original sin. However, we decide to stress solely effects and strategies needed to 
deal with the external borrowing constraint in a short term analysis. Accordingly, 
we focus on the international component of ‘original sin’ and how it affected 
economic stability and borrowing conditions of Latin American countries. 
According to this international framework, our empirical analysis is based 
on the index (OSIN3) developed by Haussmann and Panizza (2003). The index 
will be calculated for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela; 
later, we will analyse how the data fit the ‘original sin hypothesis’ throughout the 
time framework chosen (2000-2015).  
Our approach will, therefore, be based on a theoretical discussion of the 
phenomenon, by reviewing the academic literature, and a data analysis of ‘original 
sin’ in six relevant Latin American countries; in particular, we chose them because 
of their economic prominence in the area (Argentina and Brazil) and their different 
political peculiarities (Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela).  
Regarding the Latin American context, our first research goal is to analyse 
to what extent the Index (OSIN3) dynamics emphasize the ‘original sin’ and 
whether these dynamics shows signs of ‘redemption’ in the terms of Eichengreen, 
Hausmann and Panizza (2002). Secondly, we will focus on how the phenomenon 
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could be overcome through the alternatives presented in the literature, assessing 
them and taking into account the current Latin American scenario. 
We suppose that, in line with the literature, there might have been 
improvements in the country group analysed in terms of reduction of the index. 
Nevertheless, this reduction may have been mainly related to an ‘abstinence’ 
response to a crisis aftermath rather than ‘redemption’.  
The literature points some alternatives to reach ‘redemption’ including 
North-South and South-South cooperation and a multilateral arrangement. 
However, we argue that the feasibility of them is rather complex, especially 
considering the turbulent state of affairs, both economic and political in the 
developed and developing world.  
In Section 2, we deal with ‘original sin’ from a theoretical perspective, 
reviewing the effects on economic stability and analysing possible causes 
underlying the phenomenon. In Section 3, we deal with an empirical exercise, 
analysing a group of Latin American countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela (2000-2015). In the fourth section, we will 
present the alternatives able to overcome the phenomenon discussed and assess 
them under a critical perspective. Finally, we will conclude, summarizing our 
findings. 
 
2. Theoretical background: ‘Original Sin’ 
2.1 What is ‘Original Sin’? 
As originally defined in Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), ‘original sin’ 
is the “inability to borrow abroad in terms of domestic currency and to borrow 
domestically long-term”. That implies, as stated by Panizza (2006), that ‘original 
sin’ is a two-dimensional phenomenon, characterized by:   
- an international component: the local currency of countries affected by 
original sin cannot be used to borrow abroad. As a consequence, foreign debt will 
be mainly denominated in foreign currency, generating currency mismatches for 
countries that are net debtor;  
- a domestic component: the local currency is not used domestically for 
long-term borrowing (i.e., local private borrowers prefer to denominate their 
liabilities in more stable currencies in order to hedge the risk of currency 
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depreciation). Consequently, maturities in domestic currency can be only either of 
short or medium term. 
Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2002) demonstrated as the ‘original 
sin’ is a widespread phenomenon, that affects “almost all countries aside from the 
issuers of the 5 major currencies – the US dollar, the euro, the yen, the pound 
sterling and the Swiss franc”2.  
The original sin hypothesis was first developed in order to explain the 
problems that most developing countries face in borrowing in international capital 
markets (ICMs henceforth). Therefore, the focus on external debt (the international 
component of original sin) tries to describe the distortions that affect the flows of 
capital from capital-rich advanced countries to capital-poor developing countries 
(EICHENGREEN; HAUSMANN; PANIZZA, 2007)3. As a tool to explain 
development problems and dependence relations, the theory of international 
original sin shows as the deficiencies in borrowing in ICMs undermine the 
possibility for developing countries to stabilize the domestic economy when faced 
with shocks. 
 
2.2 ‘Internacional Original Sin’ as a threat to economic stability   
The balance sheet of countries suffering from original sin will be 
characterized by liabilities mainly denominated in foreign currency. If the country 
is a net debtor, it will then face a currency mismatch on the balance sheet; in this 
case, movements in the real exchange rate will generate wealth effects that may 
lead to higher volatility of output and capital flows, lower credit ratings and less 
effective monetary policies (EICHENGREEN; HAUSMANN; PANIZZA, 2002). 
All these factors undermine the domestic economic stability of countries affected 
by original sin, thus posing a threat to economic growth and development. As 
summarized in Fritz and Metzger (2006), the relation between ‘original sin’ and 
 
2 Nowadays, the international monetary system is a “non-order” (BIBOW, 2008) characterized by a 
declining importance of British Pound (in particular after Brexit), as well as of Swiss Franc and Japanese 
Yen. While China’s renminbi has officially become a reserve currency (joining the IMF’s special drawing 
rights basket the 1 October 2016), US dollar is losing its unopposed hegemony in the international monetary 
system. If China will proceed on the path of capital account liberalization, a tripartite World scenario is 
likely to take shape, where reserves will be denominated into three main currencies: US dollar, Euro and 
Renminbi. Further discussion can be found in Bergstern (2014), Campanella (2014) and Kruger (2016). 
3 Critical remarks about the conventional idea that capital flows from advanced to developing countries are 
provided by the famous “Lucas Paradox (LUCAS, 1990) and the allocation puzzle (GOURINCHAS 
JEANNE, 2013). 
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increasing economic volatility is due to three main reasons, namely currency 
mismatch, restricted lender-of-last-resort function and costs of original sin in terms 
of output reduction and uncertainty.  
First and foremost, the currency mismatch implies that any devaluation of 
the domestic currency would cause an increase in the real value of foreign debt 
stock, making more difficult its service. In this scenario, negative expectations on 
future repayments would create feedbacks resulting in capital flights, thus 
generating a spiral of worsening expectations and new capital flights. In other 
words, the capital outflows would behave in a pro-cyclical way, constituting a 
“loose cannon” for monetary authorities and their space to react. According to 
Panizza (2006), there are two ways to avoid the mismatches:  
i. Preventing foreign borrowing (both public and private); in other 
words, a country can overcome original sin following the extreme decision not to 
accumulate foreign debt4.  
ii. Accumulating foreign reserves matching the foreign debt. This 
solution seems to be the preferred for most countries suffering from original sin: 
Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003a) demonstrated indeed that these 
countries tend to accumulate more foreign reserves than countries not affected by 
the phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, Panizza argues that both measures are costly. On the one 
hand, in situations of financial autarky countries are unable to overcome or to 
alleviate shocks through international borrowing; in other words, abdicating or 
preventing foreign borrowing would mean abdicating additional investment 
finance and consumption smoothing through international financial integration. 
On the other hand, an increase in the accumulation of foreign reserves would imply 
an increasing negative spread between lower yield on reserves and the opportunity 
costs of funds5. This has been exactly the case in the recent years (especially from 
 
4 As stated by Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003a, p. 2): “A financially autarchic country will 
have no currency mismatch because it has no external debt, even though it still suffers from original sin as 
we define it”. 
5 In this regard it is important to highlight the emergence of a quasi-fiscal deficit. For instance, let us 
consider the case of Brazil. Since the accumulation of foreign reserves is performed through open market 
operations, rising bonds yields (attached to the Selic) are required in order to make government bonds 
accepted in the markets. In doing so, the government is committed to pay a high interest on bonds in order 
to obtain foreign reserves that it then holds on US American bonds with a lower yield. The spread between 
the yields paid on national short-term bonds and on the bonds in which the reserves are held creates what 
is called quasi-fiscal deficit.  
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the beginning of the 2000’s until the outbreak of the financial crisis) when the 
countries adopted such measures as a response to the turbulence of the 1990’s.  
Second, the function of “lender-of-last-resort” would be restricted. 
Considering the case of banks having liabilities in foreign currency, the Central 
Bank cannot supply liquidity to the domestic financial sector, since the country 
does not issue the currency that the debt is denominated in. In this case, the higher 
the ‘original sin’, the greater the liquidity risk that the financial sector is exposed 
to.  
Third, the short and long run costs of the ‘original sin’. In the short run the 
costs of the ‘original sin’ could be related to the costs of the currency mismatch 
and in the long run, it would be creating both uncertainty and reduction of output 
as feedback of the volatility itself. 
In Section 4, we discuss more in detail what are possible solutions to 
stabilize Latin American economies affected by ‘international original sin’. 
 
2.3 At the roof of ‘Original Sin’: main causes 
As argued in Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003b) – and 
schematized by Panizza (2006) in the Table 1 reproduced here – there are six main 
causes that can explain the existence of ‘original sin’: economic development and 
institutional quality6, lack of monetary credibility, weak fiscal position, trade links, 
political economy and international causes linked with country size. Eichengreen 
et al. (2003b) conducted a multiple regression analysis to evaluate the correlation 
between these six explanatory variables and three different independent variables, 
namely three different indicators of original sin; in this paragraph, we focus on the 
significance of each determinant in respect of OSIN3, the measure that best 
indicates the international component of ‘original sin’7. 
 
6 The most common indicator to measure economic development is GDP per capita.  However, the choice 
of the indicator in not uncontroversial. Accordingly, an early critique of the idea that economic development 
can be expressed in terms of GDP per capita can be found in Sen (1988). More generally, as shown by the 
literature on original sin, institutions matter. In this sense, Panizza (2006, p. 31) stresses that “original sin 
is merely miner’s canary, signalling the presence of weak institutions and low level of development”. In 
this sense, an alternative measure of institutional weakness for countries suffering from original sin could 
be the five-dimensions Institutional Quality Index (IQI) proposed by Nifo and Vecchione (2015), 
encompassing regulatory quality, government effectiveness, rule of law, corruption, voice and 
accountability. 
7 We will come back on this way to measure ‘original sin’ in Section 3. 
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Contrary to what might be expected, the analysis showed that there is no 
significant correlation between ‘original sin’ and the level of economic 
development; the explanatory variable, expressed in log of per capita GDP, results 
slightly significant by dropping the regional dummies in the regression, but the 
result is not robust when we try to make inference on the correlation between 
original sin and economic development within country groups.  
The absence of a robust correlation between ‘original sin’ and the level of 
development implies that other determinants linked with specific countries 
characteristics are also unlikely to explain the phenomenon; the regression analysis 
confirms this intuition, demonstrating a weak or absent correlation between OSIN3 
and trade links, characteristics of the domestic financial system, monetary 
credibility and fiscal policy-making. These results are of crucial importance 
because they contradict the common idea according to which inabilities and 
difficulties to borrow in ICMs of developing countries are a result of bad policies; 
in other words, credible monetary and fiscal policies cannot overcome a problem 
that is linked more closely with international causes.  
 
Table 1 – Theories of Original Sin and their empirical relevance 
Explanation Link with original sin Empirical relevance 
Economic 
development 
and 
institutional 
quality 
Original sin is merely the miner’s canary, 
signalling the presence of weak 
institutions and low level of economic 
development. 
GDP per capita and 
institutional quality can 
explain differences in 
original sin across country 
groups but not within 
country groups. 
Lack of 
monetary 
credibility 
Borrowers prefer to denominate their 
obligations in dollars and go bankrupt in 
the event of large depreciation, rather 
than borrow in pesos and go bankrupt 
because of high-interest rates. Foreign 
lenders take account of the fact that the 
government has less of an incentive to 
protect their property rights and may 
choose to inflate away their claims if they 
denominate them in a unit that they can 
manipulate and hence they lend only in 
foreign currency. 
Original sin is weakly 
correlated with past 
inflation but this weak 
correlation is due to the 
presence of few high 
inflation countries. At best, 
one can say that having 
credible monetary policies 
is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for 
redemption from original 
sin. 
continued on next page 
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Table 1 – Theories of Original Sin and their empirical relevance 
continued 
Weak fiscal 
position 
A government that has weak fiscal 
accounts will have an incentive to debase 
the currency in order to erode the real 
value of its obligations. The solution is to 
index the debt to some real price or to 
issue short-term debt so as to increase the 
cost of eroding the debt with inflation. 
No statistically significant 
correlation between fiscal 
ratios and original sin. 
Trade links 
Countries that trade heavily with their 
creditors have an incentive to meet their 
contractual obligations because failing to 
do so will provoke a commercial 
retaliation or, at the minimum, interrupt 
the supply of trade credits. 
No statistically significant 
correlation between trade 
openness and original sin. 
Political 
economy 
If foreigners are the main holders of 
public and private debts, then there is 
likely to be a larger domestic political 
constituency in favour of weakening the 
value of their claims and foreign 
creditors will be reluctant to lend in local 
currency unless protected by a large 
constituency of local savers. 
No statistically significant 
correlation between the 
size of the domestic 
financial system and 
original sin. 
International 
causes 
In a world with transaction costs, the 
optimal portfolio will have a finite 
number of currencies. These few 
currencies are the ones that offer better 
opportunities for diversification, i.e. the 
currencies of large countries. 
There is a strong and robust 
negative correlation 
between country size and 
original sin. 
Source: Panizza (2006). 
 
The authors demonstrated that the only significant variable is the country 
size: regression analysis shows indeed a strong negative correlation between this 
variable and original sin, both if we control for single countries and for country 
groups. As stated in the paper, “ability to borrow abroad in one’s own currency 
seems to be heavily concentrated among large countries” (Eichengreen et al. 
2003b: 5). Three relevant dimensions of country size are taken into account in the 
respective variable (SIZE) in the regression model: log of total GDP, log of total 
domestic credit valued in US dollars and log of total trade. A possible explanation 
of the robust correlation between country size and original sin can be found 
focusing on the role played by economies of scale or network externalities in 
shaping the structure of international finance. Furthermore, these findings suggest 
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that the “redemption” from original sin can only be regional or international, 
aiming to a modification of the structure of the international monetary and 
financial system. This point will be crucial in the discussion of possible 
alternatives for Latin America in Section 4, after having evaluated the dimension 
of the phenomenon in the area. 
 
2.4 The ‘Original Sin hypothesis’ in Latin America 
Latin American markets, particularly since late 1980’s, were subjected to a 
great influx of capital – so-called money chasing yield – motivated by low growth 
and low-interest rates in developed countries (external perspective) and by the 
implementation of political reforms inspired by the Washington Consensus 
(domestic perspective). Despite this good behaviour and the adoption of IMF 
recommendation, Latin American countries have been strongly hit by the reversion 
movement of the capital flows. Subject to the condition of ‘original sin’, the 
economy of these countries has faced extreme volatility of output and capital 
flows.  
A first answer to ‘original sin’ in Latin American countries during last 
decades was to abandon the national currency, adopting the currency in which debt 
is denominated (i.e. dollarization); that is still the case of countries like Ecuador, 
El Salvador and Argentina. As highlighted by Fritz and Metzger, when the option 
is the unilateral dollarization, the function of lender of last resort simply disappears 
and all debt is transformed into foreign currency. An alternative to dollarization – 
discussed in Section 4 – is monetary cooperation in form of an Optimal Currency 
Area (OCA)8. 
Facing such a big constraint to stabilization and, in its turn, development, 
in next sections our main aim is to ask the question of whether, after the turbulence 
of the 1990s, Latin American countries have reached any kind of ‘redemption to 
original sin’ (Hausmann and Panizza 2011). In Section 3, our empirical analysis 
will be based on the index OSIN3, as developed by Haussmann and Panizza 
(2003), that focuses on the international component of the original sin, as pointed 
 
8 The difference between the two alternatives is highlighted by Cardim de Carvalho (2006, p. 104): 
“Dollarization, by contrast to the creation of an OCA, is the unilateral acceptance of the US dollar as the 
national currency by another country. It is not really monetary unification, since the rules of the game as to 
issuance of money, seigniorage gains, lender-of-last-resort facilities, etc., do not change with dollarization, 
since the United States does not in fact accept any responsibility for the decisions of other countries.” 
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out in Panizza (2006). The index will be calculated for the following countries: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela; later on, we will analyse 
how the data behave throughout the time framework chosen. 
 
3. Empirical assessment on ‘Original Sin’ in Latin America  
3.1 Methodology and measures of ‘Original Sin’ 
As commented above, Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2002) created 
some indicators in order to investigate whatever a country is affected by ‘original 
sin’ or not. The authors present a vast literature about this topic, including several 
other indexes and forms of calculations and interpretations of ‘original sin’. For 
sake of simplicity, we opted to choose what is known in the literature as the best 
index for ‘original sin’. Additionally, we have chosen just to analyse the 
international side of ‘original sin’. Thus, the authors start by the indicator below:  
 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝐵௜ = 1 −
ௌ௘௖௨௥௜௧௜௘௦ ௜௡ ௖௨௥௥௘௡௖௬ ௜
ௌ௘௖௨௥௜௧௜௘௦ ௜௦௦௨௘ௗ ௕௬ ௖௢௨௡௧௥௬ ௜
  (1) 
 
INDEXBi is composed by one minus the ratio between all securities issued 
in currency i, no matter the nationality of the issuer, and all securities issued by 
country i, regardless of the currency issued. The literature states the advantages of 
using IDENXBi as an indicator to measure ‘original sin’ because it is capable to 
incorporate the possibility of hedging currency exposure via the swap market. The 
drawback of INDEXBi is that it can generate negative values, which means the 
total amount of securities in currency i is greater than the amount of total securities 
issued by country i. In order to solve this problem, a range limit is established, 
setting the index variation from zero to one: 
 
𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑁3௜ = max ቀ1 −
ୗୣୡ୳୰୧୲୧ୣୱ ୧ୱୱ୳ୣୢ ୠ୷ ୡ୭୳୬୲୰୷ ୧
ୗୣୡ୳୰୧୲୧ୣୱ ୧ୱୱ୳ୣୢ ୠ୷ ୡ୭୳୬୲୰୷ ୧
, 0ቁ  (2) 
 
OSIN3i becomes the best indicator according to the literature for two 
reasons. First, it captures the possibility of hedging exchange risks, as commented 
above. Second, it provides an aggregate and comparable measure of currency 
mismatches (EICHENGREEN; HAUSSMAN; PANIZZA, 2002; HAUSSMAN; 
PANIZZA, 2003; HAUSSMAN; PANIZZA, 2011). 
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When the index is equal to one, it indicates the country i doesn’t have any 
outstanding debt in currency i; therefore, this country is affected by ‘original sin’. 
In contrast, when the value of the indicator is zero, the country only has debts 
issued in its own currency, so there is no ‘original sin’.   
 
3.2 Empirical evidence 
In order to calculate OSIN3i, we collected data from the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS). The period and the countries were chosen based 
on data consistency and availability (2000-2015). The database provides quarterly 
data, but as we are interested in annual analysis, the fourth quarter was used as the 
yearly value9. For the nominator, we took from BIS the total amount of outstanding 
debt in currency i in the international market. For the denominator, it was taken 
the total amount of debt securities issued by the nationals I denominated in all 
currencies. In Table1, we have a summary of our findings. Also, we plot the index 
in Figure 1. Due to formatting purposes, the vertical axis starts on ‘0.5’, but it is 
important to remember the OSIN3 index can vary between 0 and 1. 
 
Table 2 – ‘Original Sin’ index for Latin American countries (OSIN3I) 
 
 Source: Authors’ calculation based on BIS database.  
 
9 In the appendix, all data are available for consultation. 
- Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela Mean
2000 0.973 1.000 0.930 1.000 0.997 1.000 0.983
2001 0.972 1.000 0.953 1.000 0.997 1.000 0.987
2002 0.992 1.000 0.967 0.994 0.996 1.000 0.991
2003 0.991 1.000 0.991 0.994 0.998 1.000 0.995
2004 0.992 0.996 0.991 0.963 0.991 1.000 0.989
2005 0.991 0.947 0.993 0.906 0.953 0.991 0.963
2006 0.987 0.902 0.977 0.873 0.871 0.956 0.928
2007 0.985 0.798 0.944 0.805 0.764 0.926 0.870
2008 0.986 0.852 0.948 0.799 0.769 0.932 0.881
2009 0.985 0.827 0.959 0.819 0.823 0.952 0.894
2010 0.988 0.798 0.903 0.790 0.810 0.989 0.880
2011 0.991 0.775 0.875 0.775 0.835 0.995 0.874
2012 0.994 0.818 0.898 0.759 0.838 0.996 0.884
2013 0.996 0.837 0.932 0.800 0.811 0.997 0.895
2014 0.997 0.860 0.956 0.833 0.840 0.997 0.914
2015 0.994 0.897 0.966 0.904 0.872 0.997 0.938
Mean 0.988 0.894 0.949 0.876 0.885 0.983
Original Sin Index for Latin American Countries (OSIN3i)
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Figure 1 – OSIN3 for Latin American countries (2000-2015) 
 
   Source: Authors’ compilation based on BIS database. 
 
Our findings explicitly show that all the countries analysed – although in 
different ways – are trapped in the ‘original sin’ condition. The average OSIN3 
result for the region in 2015 is 0.990, clearly indicating the presence of ‘original 
sin’. More important, it is not only a current situation, but also a historical situation, 
since 2000 in our findings and much earlier (HAUSSMAN; PANIZZA, 2003). 
Interestingly, Mexico shows a better scenario in 2007 and 2008 (0.764 and 0.769 
respectively), but it is followed by increases in the ‘original sin’ index. The same 
happens to Brazil and Colombia in 2011 (0.775 for both). These three countries 
show signs of “redemption” (Brazil 2007-2013; Colombia 2007-2013; and Mexico 
2007-2014); in other words, the respective index result is lower or equal to 0.85 
(HAUSMANN, 2010). Although, the “redemption” signs are reversed after the 
2008 crisis, indicating it was more due to “abstinence” than a proper “redemption”.  
When we take a closer look at each country’s index evolution, it becomes 
clearer how the index felt since 2001 for the majority of the cases. Only Argentina 
and Venezuela present higher levels of ‘original sin’ through the whole period of 
analysis. As said before, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico could reach better levels of 
‘original sin’ by 2006, but in all three cases, this scenario was reverted to what 
looks like a new convergence of the index in high levels. 
The reduction of the level of the index in the countries analysed (except for 
Argentina) could be explained by movements towards the reduction of ‘currency 
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mismatches’, both for the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves matching 
their foreign debt and for the abstinence from acquiring and accumulating foreign 
debt (public and private). Ocampo (2009) shows how Latin American countries 
tried to strengthen their external balance sheet from adverse shocks by building up 
reserves and lowering its levels of debt securities. Brazil and Colombia, for 
example, went from having 18.1% and 78.8% of reserves as a percentage of 
liabilities in 2001 to 35.4% and 114.6% respectively. Furthermore, these two 
countries lowered significantly their liabilities to GDP ratio in their external 
balance sheets (34.9% to 28.9% for Brazil; 13.8% to 0.9% for Colombia). Both 
these actors heavily impacted on the OSIN3 index, after all, these countries showed 
the lowest level of ‘original sin’ according to our data. This argument reinforces 
the idea of “abstinence” rather than “redemption”, as said before. 
Also, Liberato, Holland and Vieira (2012) state this downward trend to the 
OSIN3 index might be due to higher levels of liquidity after the 2001 crisis in the 
U.S. The authors explain the phenomena relating it to new financial instruments 
created in response to the low levels of interest rates, both in the U.S. and globally. 
This scenario enabled emerging countries to issue debt in their own currencies in 
the international market, which moves through the logic of “money chasing yield”. 
Looking deeply at Argentina, for being the most extreme case in our 
analysis, Ocampo (2009) also shows how the reverse situation contributed to a 
stagnation of the Argentinian index. Its liabilities to GDP ratio increased from -
0.3% to 29% (2001-2007). The Argentinean case, in particular, due to the crisis 
that has hit the country in 2001-2002 (the exact period when the liabilities to GDP 
ratio presented the biggest increase: from -0.3% in 2001, 19.8% 2002 and 20.1% 
in 2003). 
The crisis in Argentina ended up being more severe than the ones in Mexico 
(1994) and Brazil (1999), developing into banking, financial and currency crisis, 
which is associated in the literature (Prates 2002) to the strategy of stabilization 
adopted there. The Convertibility Law of 1991 established a fixed exchange rate 
regime with currency convertibility (i.e. a currency board), which authorized 
monetary and financial contracts in any foreign currency. The capital flows were 
in great part deposits of non-residents at local banks, which, in their turn, provided 
funding for the expansion of loans and also implied an increase of foreign 
exchange reserves and bank reserves. The capital flows management strategy 
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adopted was the non-sterilizing intervention, which resulted - according to Prates 
- in a high degree of receptivity of the economy to these flows. This framework 
culminated in a credit expansion (with the key role of the “argendollars”) that was 
backed up by the demand of firms and households. All these movements were not 
followed by a recovery of the stabilization of the Argentinean peso, but it rather 
deepened the dollarization, which has been even more encouraged in 1995 (after 
the Mexican crisis – the “Tequila effect”) and 1997, 1998, 1999 (after the Asian, 
Russian and Brazilian crises). Having to raise the interest rates and being hit by a 
reversal movement of the flows, Argentina faced the contraction of domestic 
liquidity, directly convertible into dollars, which resulted in a banking crisis. This 
development pointed out the lack of a lender-of-last-resort of the strong currency, 
exactly as described by Fritz and Metzger (2006) when a country unilaterally 
adopts a foreign currency. What postponed the collapse of the model was the fiscal 
imbalance through the external indebtedness of the public sector (which impacts 
the index). Different than in Brazil, the public debt was not related to the 
sterilization operations nor to the dollarization of public debt, as in Mexico. 
In order to look at the region as a whole, it was taken the simple mean of 
our calculation of OSIN3 and put into a graph. We can see how the index 
developed throughout time. The objective of this exercise is to compare our 
findings with Haussman and Panizza (2011) and check for new trends in the 
updated data. 
We notice in Figure 2 that, prior to the crisis of 2008, countries were able 
to issue more debt in their own currency, making the index value, therefore, 
smaller. However, after the crisis this tendency is reverted, implicating in a higher 
proportion of debts being issued in foreign currency; on average, this has led to 
higher values of OSIN3. These results are similar to those presented by Haussman 
and Panizza (2011) and Liberato, Holland and Vieira (2012).  
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Figure 2 – OSIN3 average for Latin American region (2000-2015) 
 
    Source: Authors’ compilation based on BIS database. 
 
As a third exercise, we are interested in understanding the composition of 
debts securities in those countries. First, we divided the outstanding debt amount 
into two ones, denominated in domestic currency and denominated in foreign 
currency on average throughout our timeframe. As result, we can see that all 
analysed countries issue their respective debts mainly in foreign currency. In 
Figure 3 we can see that Argentina, Chile and Venezuela have an extreme scenario, 
with 99% of their securities in foreign currency, on average. Brazil, Colombia and 
Mexico present a slightly better scenario, issuing 95%, 91% and 89% of their 
respective debts in foreign currency. The result is shown in the graph below: 
 
Figure 3 – Composition of debt for Latin American countries (average 
between 2000-2015) 
 
           Source: Authors’ compilation based on BIS database. 
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In order to see more in-depth the composition of debt securities, we now 
want to investigate in which currencies these liabilities are denominated. For that, 
we took the outstanding amount of debts issued by country i and decomposed into 
three parts. The first is debt securities in U.S. dollars, the second debt in Euro and 
the third would be the residual (the difference between total debt and debt 
denominated in U.S dollar and Euro) representing debt securities issued in other 
currencies, including domestic. The reason for not showing a higher level of 
disaggregation in our data is due to the lack of information provided by our 
database. Just as the exercise above, it was taken the average composition between 
2000 and 2015. 
 
Figure 4 – Debt security decomposition by currencies 
 
           Source: Authors’ compilation based on BIS database. 
 
Both Figures 3 and 4 reaffirm our first finding, whereby Latin American 
countries mostly issue their debts in foreign currency, being, therefore, affected by 
‘original sin’.  It is visually clear how the main countries of Latin America are 
deeply dependent on debt issued either in euros or in U.S. Furthermore, it is 
important to emphasize Argentina being a singularity by the high percentage of its 
debts issued in euros (39%), compared to other countries investigated. In addition, 
Venezuela also represents an extreme scenario with 93% of its debts securities in 
international markets being issued in U.S. dollars. It clearly emphasizes dollar 
dependence and ‘original sin’, representing harmful effects to the economy. 
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Considering the fact that the Latin American countries are far from reaching 
‘redemption’ and that the falling trend of the OSIN3 in the period of 2000-2008 in 
the majority of countries analysed has already been partly reverted, in the next 
section we investigate possible alternatives for ‘redemption’. 
 
4. Is there a way to halt ‘Original Sin’? 
4.1 Unilateral strategy 
Before presenting the alternatives proposed on the literature concerning the 
‘redemption’ towards ‘original sin’, it is important to point out, once more, that the 
strategy adopted in most of emerging market countries has been the unilateral 
approach. This was especially true in Latin American countries, including the ones 
analysed in the empirical Section10 through the channel of accumulation of foreign 
reserves, which implies in some costs11on the one hand, but, on the other, it 
functions as a safeguard to the currency mismatch.  
This unilateral strategy has been taken as a response to the lesson learned 
during the crises in Asia, Russia and Latin America and has, indeed, functioned in 
matters of reducing the exposure of the emerging market economies (in this case, 
the Latin American ones) in the course of the crisis of 2008. Nonetheless, this 
unilateral strategy is reversible and is rather a sign of ‘abstinence’ than 
‘redemption’. We will expose in this chapter the alternatives that could answer the 
question of what could bring ‘redemption’ to the ‘original sin’ and in the end we 
will evaluate the alternatives presented having the global and regional political and 
economic scenarios as a background. 
 
4.2 Bonds denominated in a basket of emerging market currencies 
Panizza (2006) argues that one possible ‘redemption’ to the ‘original sin’ 
would be, as proposed in Eichengreen and Hausmann (2003), an international 
financial institution creating “markets for local currency emerging market debt by 
issuing bonds denominated in a basket of different emerging market currencies”. 
According to Panizza (2006), the international initiative would work as a hedge 
(swap for their currency obligation) for emerging market countries. Furthermore, 
 
10 The unilateral strategy and respective reduction of the index is discussed on Section 3.2, being related to 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves matching the foreign debt and to the abstinence from acquiring 
and accumulating foreign debt (public and private). 
11 The costs of the accumulation of foreign reserves matching foreign debt are discussed in Section 2.2. 
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this strategy would be in line with the finds exposed in Eichengreen, Hausmann 
and Panizza (2002), namely the fact that the issuers of bonds in exotic currencies 
are mostly non-residents (due to the worthiness given by the market to bonds that 
separate currency and credit risk). In more practical terms, Eichengreen et. al 
(2002) argue that the issuance of the bonds should be done in four main steps. 
The first step would be the development of an appropriate currency basket 
index. According to the authors, this step would require the “creation of a unit of 
account that would include a well-diversified set of emerging-market and 
developing-country currencies.” This unit would then “represent claims on a more 
diversified economy”. Resulting in an increasing instability, given that while for 
some countries the shocks are positive, for others they are negative.  
The second would be having the World Bank and other international 
financial institutions issuing debt denominated in the EM index. As already 
mentioned above, “the experience of countries escaping original sin has been led 
not by residents but by foreigners issuing in exotic currencies, the international 
financial institutions in particular” (EICHENGREEN; HAUSSMAN; PANIZZA, 
2002). For this reason, the authors argue that “the World Bank and other 
international financial institutions should start issuing debt in the index” and their 
AAA rating would make them reach institutional investors.   
The third would be having the G-10 countries issuing debt denominated in 
the index. If the first 2 steps succeed, then the high-grade non-residents would play 
the role of developing the market. At this point, the governments of the countries 
that issue the five major currencies could play a role (U.S., Euroland, Japan, the 
UK and Switzerland).  
The fourth and last step would be further developing the EM index market. 
Such market would require the participation of institutional investors and mutual 
funds creating products that would add credit risk to the index. 
 
4.3 Monetary cooperation (North-South and South-South cooperation) 
Another alternative being debated in the literature is monetary cooperation. 
As explained in Panizza (2006), a monetary cooperation could be described as a 
“situation in which a set of countries follow similar monetary policies and hence 
do not allow large swings of their bilateral exchange reserves”, “fix their exchange 
reserves” or “adopt a single currency”. According to Panizza, there would be two 
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different options of monetary cooperation: the first would be the North-South-
Cooperation (NSC henceforth) and, in this case a developing country would be 
integrated with a developed country; the second would be the South-South-
Cooperation (SSC henceforth), between two developing countries. 
However, as stated by Fritz and Metzger (2006), an NSC with a “bilateral 
entry to the US dollar or the eurozone does not seem feasible” for the developing 
(South) countries. Kregel (2006) highlights one good example of NSC, the ‘Chiang 
Mai Initiative’, launched by the ASEAN+3 in 2000 as an expansion of the ASEAN 
Swap arrangement. But for the Latin American countries, the NSC keeps being 
less likely to happen, especially considering that the interaction that the Asian 
countries have with Japan and other huge players as China and Korea does not 
have a counterpart in Latin America. This posed the authors to argue that the SSC 
would be the only viable alternative.  
The SSC could result, according to Fritz and Metzger (2006) in “a collective 
protection against domestic pressures through a regional exchange rate 
arrangement”. However, according to Panizza (2006), the viability and 
effectiveness of this type of arrangement would depend on the size of the country, 
as already mentioned in Section 2.3, being the only variable robustly related to 
‘original sin’. As a result, this would imply that “international investors might be 
interested in holding assets denominated in a currency issued by the monetary 
union that encompasses large and well-diversified economies”, that’s why 
monetary unions among larger countries might have a bigger chance of being part 
of the international portfolio. 
Focusing on the Latin American perspective, Kregel (2006) stresses the fact 
that the Mercosur could be one example of regional coordination in order to reduce 
dependence on external borrowing, and thus, in our case, the ‘original sin’. 
Nevertheless, the agreement never crossed the level of setting a common external 
tariff and, as reminded by the author, has not reached any “means of monetary 
cooperation or coordination, although exchange rate volatility between the two 
major member states has been a continued source of friction since its creation in 
1991” (Kregel, 2006, :46). 
Touching upon these two major economies of the South American 
agreement, Carvalho (2006) comments the proposal of setting a monetary union 
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between Argentina and Brazil12, that has been first raised by the former 
Argentinean president Carlos Menem in 1999. According to Carvalho (2006), a 
scheme with fixed exchange rates (or some kind of monetary coordination) could 
contribute to reduce price uncertainty and stimulate trade. The author argues in 
favour of “a stronger effort at macroeconomic policy coordination” together with 
the adoption of “common protective devices” (i.e. capital controls) in order to 
minimize external vulnerability related to the capital flows and to strengthen both 
countries’ economy. However, going to the direction of a common currency would 
be still an uncertain path. If we consider the Eurozone experience and all the 
political and economic constraints involving such an ambitious project and we 
compare with the little coordination reached so far by the Mercosur, the currency 
union becomes an even further option. 
 
4.4 Assessing the alternatives in the current political and economic 
scenarios 
The international initiative would be very effective in terms of ‘redemption’ 
of the ‘original sin’, being consistent with the findings in the literature. As stated 
by Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2002), the international initiative would 
incorporate a large group of countries representing over 90% of the population and 
the GDP of the developing world through the new EM index.  Since the size is the 
only variable robustly correlated with the ‘original sin’ (PANIZZA, 2006), this 
broad approach would be one important strategy to be considered. Moreover, the 
EM index would meet the existing demand of non-residents for bonds emitted in 
exotic currencies. The South-South cooperation, especially the one involving 
Argentina and Brazil, could also fit the argument of country size and somehow the 
demand of non-residents. 
Nonetheless, the current state of affairs leads us to doubt the feasibility of 
the alternatives. In the international scenario, we can highlight the weak economic 
recovery of the developed countries and the political turmoil involving the 
elections of nationalist conservative parties in the political sphere that push even 
further away from any project of integration and coordination. The international 
 
12 The monetary union between Argentina and Brazil has been supported, in the Brazilian case, by part of 
the conservative economists as a matter of imposing fiscal and monetary constraints (parallel to the ones of 
the Maastricht Treaty). Cardim de Carvalho highlights that, in this case, importance was given to the 
independence of the Central Bank and to the imposition of limits to fiscal deficits. 
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initiative, on the one hand, would require the commitment of international 
financial institutions, of the G-10 and so on, what is hardly achievable in the 
current context. The SSC in the Mercosur, on the other hand, would require a more 
bidding group. At the moment, the integration process in the block suffers even a 
step back, with the temporary exclusion of Venezuela. Furthermore, the big players 
of the block, Brazil and Argentina (that could also set some kind of coordination 
among themselves) face turbulence, both challenged by high inflation and rather 
low growth or even deflation. In the Brazilian case, a complex political and 
economic crisis which involved the impeachment of the former President Dilma 
Rousseff gave rise for the extreme-right Jair Bolsonaro’s election, who promises a 
great distance from the Latin American block. As for Argentina, recently the 
country has been suffering from the deterioration of Macri’s government and 
reputation alongside the turbulent economic scenario. Because of the current status 
of both countries, it makes the cooperation dream away from becoming true. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have discussed ‘original sin’ in Latin America firstly from 
a theoretical perspective and then by measuring the phenomenon with the most 
common indicator (OSIN3). In the theoretical section, we described the two 
dimensions of ‘original sin’ - domestic and international - and we have opted to 
focus on the latter. From the empirical analysis conducted on the selected Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela), 
we could verify, through the estimation of the index OSIN3, how countries were 
affected by ‘original sin’ in the last 15 years. We have noticed possible signs of 
‘redemption’ for some countries, while others had no signs of improvement 
whatsoever (Argentina for example). However, the situation is reversed, indicating 
that it was not ‘redemption’, but countries pursued abstaining themselves in the 
ICM while building up reserves in a favourable economic scenario.  We reaffirm 
the dependency of the countries analysed to debts in foreign currencies by looking 
at the composition of debts securities issued.  
Since international causes play a key role in Latin America, only measures 
that aim to modify the international monetary and financial system towards better 
coordination could be credible alternatives. The international initiative would be 
very effective in terms of ‘redemption’, being consistent with the findings in the 
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literature, but its feasibility can be questioned; it requires indeed the commitment 
of international financial institutions, of the G-10 and so on.  
Other approaches such as NSC and SSC (more specifically within the 
Mercosur or even a monetary arrangement between Argentina and Brazil) ought 
to be considered. However, they are also subjected to feasibility constraints, 
especially regarding the current state of affairs, both internationally, within the 
Mercosur and domestically. Ultimately, a profound reform of the international 
monetary system seems to be needed. In this regard, the role played recently by 
the BRICS with the creation of the New Development Bank could be seen as a step 
forward in such a direction, as an alternative to the post-Bretton Woods 
institutions. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 – Debt Securities issued by Argentina and debt securities issued in 
Argentinian Pesos from 2000-2015 
SECURITIES ISSUED BY 
ARGENTINA 
TOTAL SECURITIES ISSUED IN 
ARGENTINIAN PESOS 
Measure C:Gross 
issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding 
Measure C:Gross 
issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding 
2000-Q4 448 87,053 2000-Q4 102 2,349 
2001-Q4 1,391 90,161 2001-Q4 0 2,528 
2002-Q4 155 91,233 2002-Q4 0 761 
2003-Q4 0 94,799 2003-Q4 0 859 
2004-Q4 329 93,175 2004-Q4 0 760 
2005-Q4 440 57,743 2005-Q4 0 545 
2006-Q4 1,085 60,769 2006-Q4 1 792 
2007-Q4 695 63,371 2007-Q4 0 924 
2008-Q4 15 51,313 2008-Q4 0 704 
2009-Q4 500 50,527 2009-Q4 0 745 
2010-Q4 1,906 51,041 2010-Q4 0 623 
2011-Q4 85 51,136 2011-Q4 44 478 
2012-Q4 0 50,774 2012-Q4 0 313 
2013-Q4 675 52,538 2013-Q4 0 199 
2014-Q4 121 50,145 2014-Q4 0 129 
2015-Q4 310 49,572 2015-Q4 95 306 
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Table 2 – Argentina’s debt securities decomposed into Euro and U.S dollar 
from 2000-2015 
 EURO US DOLLAR Composition 
Measure C:Gross issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding 
C:Gross 
issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding EURO 
US 
DOLLARS OTHER 
2000-Q4 196 26,113 250 54,538 30% 63% 7% 
2001-Q4 30 23,646 1361 61,018 26% 68% 6% 
2002-Q4 0 27,678 155 59,225 30% 65% 5% 
2003-Q4 0 32,894 0 57,057 35% 60% 5% 
2004-Q4 14 34,934 315 53,323 37% 57% 5% 
2005-Q4 0 23,482 440 33,198 41% 57% 2% 
2006-Q4 0 25,508 1085 34,205 42% 56% 2% 
2007-Q4 0 27,498 695 34,888 43% 55% 2% 
2008-Q4 0 23,792 15 26,736 46% 52% 2% 
2009-Q4 0 23,979 500 25,664 47% 51% 2% 
2010-Q4 0 21,760 1896 28,343 43% 56% 2% 
2011-Q4 0 20,642 85 29,354 40% 57% 2% 
2012-Q4 0 21,049 0 28,598 41% 56% 2% 
2013-Q4 0 21,823 675 29,691 42% 57% 2% 
2014-Q4 0 19,212 121 30,031 38% 60% 2% 
2015-Q4 0 17,228 310 31,408 35% 63% 2% 
    MEAN 39% 58% 3% 
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Table 3 – Argentina’s debt securities divided by domestic and foreign 
currency from 2000-2015 (Total and percentage) 
Measure A:All currencies 
D:Domestic 
currency 
F:Foreign 
currency 
Domestic 
% 
Foreign 
% 
2000-Q4 87053 2012 85041 2% 98% 
2001-Q4 90161 2153 88007 2% 98% 
2002-Q4 91233 648 90585 1% 99% 
2003-Q4 94799 730 94069 1% 99% 
2004-Q4 93175 633 92542 1% 99% 
2005-Q4 57743 444 57299 1% 99% 
2006-Q4 60769 440 60329 1% 99% 
2007-Q4 63371 407 62964 1% 99% 
2008-Q4 51313 210 51102 0% 100% 
2009-Q4 50527 297 50231 1% 99% 
2010-Q4 51041 293 50747 1% 99% 
2011-Q4 51136 272 50865 1% 99% 
2012-Q4 50774 157 50617 0% 100% 
2013-Q4 52538 120 52418 0% 100% 
2014-Q4 50145 423 49721 1% 99% 
2015-Q4 49572 543 49029 1% 99% 
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Table 4 – Debt Securities issued by Brazil and debt securities issued in 
Brazilian Real from 2000-2015 
SECURITIES ISSUED BY BRAZIL TOTAL SECURITIES ISSUED IN REAL 
Measure C:Gross 
issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding 
Measure C:Gross 
issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding 
2000-Q4 2,558 87,253 2000-Q4 0 15 
2001-Q4 2,726 82,388 2001-Q4 0 0 
2002-Q4 2,549 89,823 2002-Q4 0 0 
2003-Q4 6,647 105,554 2003-Q4 0 0 
2004-Q4 3,254 106,638 2004-Q4 269 414 
2005-Q4 5,667 108,772 2005-Q4 1,139 5,768 
2006-Q4 9,028 111,735 2006-Q4 2,144 10,954 
2007-Q4 5,894 120,796 2007-Q4 1,537 24,398 
2008-Q4 2,017 119,463 2008-Q4 515 17,649 
2009-Q4 15,327 141,774 2009-Q4 2,053 24,586 
2010-Q4 10,824 175,215 2010-Q4 5,715 35,390 
2011-Q4 12,065 207,374 2011-Q4 1,605 46,611 
2012-Q4 21,910 263,731 2012-Q4 3,557 47,900 
2013-Q4 15,265 294,334 2013-Q4 2,206 48,033 
2014-Q4 8,353 321,362 2014-Q4 1,860 45,091 
2015-Q4 2,366 293,158 2015-Q4 2,475 30,050 
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Table 5 – Brazil’s debt securities decomposed into Euro and U.S dollar from 
2000-2015 
 EURO US DOLLARS 
Measure C:Gross issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding 
C:Gross 
issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding EURO 
US 
DOLLARS OTHER 
2000-Q4 735 11,031 1183 72,974 13% 84% 4% 
2001-Q4 183 11,918 2495 65,195 14% 79% 6% 
2002-Q4 1,079 16,340 1470 67,650 18% 75% 6% 
2003-Q4 19 17,816 6399 83,753 17% 79% 4% 
2004-Q4 2 19,306 3110 83,527 18% 78% 4% 
2005-Q4 132 15,125 5006 87,356 14% 80% 6% 
2006-Q4 4 15,228 8317 88,257 14% 79% 7% 
2007-Q4 18 10,280 5483 95,481 9% 79% 12% 
2008-Q4 40 9,297 1937 99,353 8% 83% 9% 
2009-Q4 99 7,686 14996 120,353 5% 85% 10% 
2010-Q4 1,018 9,445 8261 151,304 5% 86% 8% 
2011-Q4 2,523 10,932 8435 179,272 5% 86% 8% 
2012-Q4 2,712 13,544 17920 231,930 5% 88% 7% 
2013-Q4 376 16,416 14569 260,786 6% 89% 6% 
2014-Q4 163 21,011 7787 282,930 7% 88% 5% 
2015-Q4 58 17,606 1947 262,387 6% 90% 4% 
    MEAN 10% 83% 7% 
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Table 6 – Brazil’s debt securities divided by domestic and foreign currency 
from 2000-2015 (Total and percentage) 
Measure A:All currencies 
D:Domestic 
currency 
F:Foreign 
currency 
Domestic 
% 
Foreign 
% 
2000-Q4 87253 1196 86057 1% 99% 
2001-Q4 82388 1164 81224 1% 99% 
2002-Q4 89823 1535 88288 2% 98% 
2003-Q4 105554 2077 103477 2% 98% 
2004-Q4 106638 2454 104184 2% 98% 
2005-Q4 108772 3554 105218 3% 97% 
2006-Q4 111735 5476 106259 5% 95% 
2007-Q4 120796 10125 110671 8% 92% 
2008-Q4 119463 8085 111378 7% 93% 
2009-Q4 141774 10818 130956 8% 92% 
2010-Q4 175215 11134 164080 6% 94% 
2011-Q4 207374 12943 194431 6% 94% 
2012-Q4 263731 16527 247204 6% 94% 
2013-Q4 294334 15498 278836 5% 95% 
2014-Q4 321362 23758 297604 7% 93% 
2015-Q4 293158 19433 273725 7% 93% 
   MEAN 5% 95% 
 
  
Gallo, Góes e Moraes  164 
  
Revista de Economia, v. 40, n. 72, p. 134-175, 2019  
Table 7 – Debt Securities issued by Chile and debt securities issued in 
Chilean Pesos from 2000-2015 
SECURITIES ISSUED BY CHILE TOTAL SECURITIES ISSUED IN CHILEAN PESOS 
Measure C:Gross 
issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding 
Measure C:Gross 
issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding 
2000-Q4 0 5,313 2001-Q1 142 370 
2001-Q4 650 6,989 2002-Q1 0 330 
2002-Q4 825 9,026 2003-Q1 0 301 
2003-Q4 500 9,948 2004-Q1 0 91 
2004-Q4 500 10,660 2005-Q1 0 96 
2005-Q4 0 10,707 2006-Q1 8 79 
2006-Q4 500 10,790 2007-Q1 0 245 
2007-Q4 65 10,322 2008-Q1 54 581 
2008-Q4 0 10,024 2009-Q1 37 517 
2009-Q4 1,051 11,190 2010-Q1 0 464 
2010-Q4 1,500 15,843 2011-Q1 31 1,529 
2011-Q4 1,650 20,161 2012-Q1 188 2,521 
2012-Q4 3,755 25,861 2013-Q1 595 2,631 
2013-Q4 4,244 35,553 2014-Q1 212 2,434 
2014-Q4 4,909 45,977 2015-Q1 52 2,012 
2015-Q4 180 52,859 2016-Q1 5 1,792 
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Table 8 – Chile’s debt securities decomposed into Euro and U.S dollar from 
2000-2015 
 EURO US DOLLARS Composition 
Measure C:Gross issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding 
C:Gross 
issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding EURO 
US 
DOLLARS OTHER 
2000-Q4 0 288 0 5,025 5% 95% 0% 
2001-Q4 0 273 650 6,716 4% 96% 0% 
2002-Q4 0 524 825 8,502 6% 94% 0% 
2003-Q4 0 631 500 9,317 6% 94% 0% 
2004-Q4 0 409 500 10,252 4% 96% 0% 
2005-Q4 0 0 0 10,707 0% 100% 0% 
2006-Q4 0 0 500 10,790 0% 100% 0% 
2007-Q4 0 0 65 10,322 0% 100% 0% 
2008-Q4 0 0 0 9,900 0% 99% 1% 
2009-Q4 0 0 1000 11,001 0% 98% 2% 
2010-Q4 0 0 1500 14,961 0% 94% 6% 
2011-Q4 0 0 1650 18,984 0% 94% 6% 
2012-Q4 0 0 3500 24,394 0% 94% 6% 
2013-Q4 0 0 3425 31,962 0% 90% 10% 
2014-Q4 995 1,700 3615 40,146 4% 87% 9% 
2015-Q4 51 3,146 50 45,194 6% 85% 9% 
    MEAN 2% 95% 3% 
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Table 9 – Chile’s debt securities divided by domestic and foreign currency 
from 2000-2015 (Total and percentage) 
Measure A:All currencies 
D:Domestic 
currency 
F:Foreign 
currency 
Domestic 
% 
Foreign 
% 
Quarter      
2000-Q4 5313 0 5313 0% 100% 
2001-Q4 6989 0 6989 0% 100% 
2002-Q4 9026 0 9026 0% 100% 
2003-Q4 9948 0 9948 0% 100% 
2004-Q4 10660 0 10660 0% 100% 
2005-Q4 10707 0 10707 0% 100% 
2006-Q4 10790 0 10790 0% 100% 
2007-Q4 10322 0 10322 0% 100% 
2008-Q4 10024 0 10024 0% 100% 
2009-Q4 11190 0 11190 0% 100% 
2010-Q4 15843 581 15262 4% 96% 
2011-Q4 20161 833 19328 4% 96% 
2012-Q4 25861 908 24953 4% 96% 
2013-Q4 35553 1010 34543 3% 97% 
2014-Q4 45977 1107 44870 2% 98% 
2015-Q4 52859 984 51875 1% 99% 
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Table 10 – Debt Securities issued by Colombia and debt securities issued in 
Colombian Pesos from 2000-2015 
SECURITIES ISSUED BY 
COLOMBIA 
TOTAL SECURITIES ISSUED IN 
COLOMBIAN PESOS 
Measure C:Gross 
issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding 
Measure C:Gross 
issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding 
2000-Q4 348 8,692 2000-Q4  1 
2001-Q4 1,000 11,839 2001-Q4  1 
2002-Q4 500 12,243 2002-Q4 0 79 
2003-Q4 0 12,642 2003-Q4 0 82 
2004-Q4 544 13,367 2004-Q4 374 490 
2005-Q4 843 13,790 2005-Q4 320 1,297 
2006-Q4 468 15,665 2006-Q4 0 1,994 
2007-Q4 1,460 18,821 2007-Q4 214 3,661 
2008-Q4 0 17,918 2008-Q4 150 3,604 
2009-Q4 1,903 23,155 2009-Q4 47 4,186 
2010-Q4 21 24,434 2010-Q4 287 5,135 
2011-Q4 1,512 28,969 2011-Q4 37 6,507 
2012-Q4 33 33,408 2012-Q4 59 8,038 
2013-Q4 1,758 41,262 2013-Q4 91 8,251 
2014-Q4 1,076 46,711 2014-Q4 182 7,813 
2015-Q4 30 50,845 2015-Q4 138 4,889 
 
  
Gallo, Góes e Moraes  168 
  
Revista de Economia, v. 40, n. 72, p. 134-175, 2019  
Table 11 – Colombia’s debt securities decomposed into Euro and U.S dollar 
from 2000-2015 
 EURO US DOLLARS Composition 
Measure C:Gross issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding 
C:Gross 
issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding EURO 
US 
DOLLARS OTHER 
2000-Q4 348 1,254 0 6,819 14% 78% 7% 
2001-Q4 0 2,165 1000 9,059 18% 77% 5% 
2002-Q4 0 2,360 500 9,305 19% 76% 5% 
2003-Q4 0 2,273 0 10,003 18% 79% 3% 
2004-Q4 0 2,452 170 10,135 18% 76% 6% 
2005-Q4 0 1,416 400 10,884 10% 79% 11% 
2006-Q4 0 1,580 468 11,979 10% 76% 13% 
2007-Q4 0 1,767 1460 13,472 9% 72% 19% 
2008-Q4 0 557 0 14,233 3% 79% 17% 
2009-Q4 0 576 1400 18,748 2% 81% 17% 
2010-Q4 0 534 21 19,276 2% 79% 19% 
2011-Q4 0 0 1512 23,571 0% 81% 19% 
2012-Q4 0 0 33 27,356 0% 82% 18% 
2013-Q4 0 0 1758 35,461 0% 86% 14% 
2014-Q4 0 0 1076 41,221 0% 88% 12% 
2015-Q4 0 0 30 47,403 0% 93% 7% 
    MEAN 8% 80% 12% 
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Table 12 – Colombia’s debt securities divided by domestic and foreign 
currency from 2000-2015 (Total and percentage) 
Measure A:All currencies 
D:Domestic 
currency 
F:Foreign 
currency 
Domestic 
% 
Foreign 
% 
2000-Q4 8692  8692 0% 100% 
2001-Q4 11839  11839 0% 100% 
2002-Q4 12243  12243 0% 100% 
2003-Q4 12642  12642 0% 100% 
2004-Q4 13367 396 12972 3% 97% 
2005-Q4 13790 1127 12663 8% 92% 
2006-Q4 15665 1720 13945 11% 89% 
2007-Q4 18821 3185 15636 17% 83% 
2008-Q4 17918 2880 15038 16% 84% 
2009-Q4 23155 3097 20058 13% 87% 
2010-Q4 24434 3795 20639 16% 84% 
2011-Q4 28969 4530 24439 16% 84% 
2012-Q4 33408 5532 27876 17% 83% 
2013-Q4 41262 5374 35889 13% 87% 
2014-Q4 46711 5117 41594 11% 89% 
2015-Q4 50845 3068 47777 9% 91% 
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Table 13 – Debt Securities issued by Mexico and debt securities issued in 
Mexican Pesos from 2000-2015 
SECURITIES ISSUED BY MEXICO TOTAL SECURITIES ISSUED IN MEXICAN PESOS 
Measure C:Gross issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding Measure 
C:Gross 
issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding 
2000-Q4 2,393 85,533 2000-Q4 0 220 
2001-Q4 2,142 81,030 2001-Q4 0 230 
2002-Q4 2,263 80,591 2002-Q4 195 289 
2003-Q4 3,448 71,899 2003-Q4 0 178 
2004-Q4 2,632 79,623 2004-Q4 2 702 
2005-Q4 1,899 82,648 2005-Q4 1,875 3,870 
2006-Q4 3,896 84,724 2006-Q4 3,609 10,927 
2007-Q4 4,048 88,886 2007-Q4 2,345 20,949 
2008-Q4 2,803 82,274 2008-Q4 549 19,024 
2009-Q4 9,603 93,011 2009-Q4 771 16,489 
2010-Q4 3,899 102,203 2010-Q4 596 19,465 
2011-Q4 5,772 119,193 2011-Q4 1,917 19,622 
2012-Q4 8,922 144,940 2012-Q4 3,327 23,428 
2013-Q4 13,829 173,263 2013-Q4 1,620 32,692 
2014-Q4 9,385 192,850 2014-Q4 440 30,862 
2015-Q4 4,716 209,041 2015-Q4 266 26,822 
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Table 14 – Mexico’s debt securities decomposed into Euro and U.S dollar 
from 2000-2015 
 EURO US DOLLARS Composition 
Measure C:Gross issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding C:Gross issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding EURO 
US 
DOLLARS OTHER 
2000-Q4 7 10,495 2386 69,113 12% 81% 7% 
2001-Q4 9 9,694 2134 66,042 12% 82% 7% 
2002-Q4 0 10,727 2068 66,242 13% 82% 4% 
2003-Q4 0 11,380 2936 56,812 16% 79% 5% 
2004-Q4 971 12,265 1662 63,771 15% 80% 5% 
2005-Q4 54 12,757 1380 66,634 15% 81% 4% 
2006-Q4 0 13,455 3158 67,567 16% 80% 4% 
2007-Q4 70 15,824 3906 67,953 18% 76% 6% 
2008-Q4 79 14,338 2597 63,504 17% 77% 5% 
2009-Q4 2,070 16,049 5202 69,258 17% 74% 8% 
2010-Q4 88 14,229 1962 75,450 14% 74% 12% 
2011-Q4 1,389 14,989 2174 89,672 13% 75% 12% 
2012-Q4 0 16,653 6993 108,883 11% 75% 13% 
2013-Q4 3,522 23,892 9662 126,278 14% 73% 13% 
2014-Q4 37 23,934 9346 144,295 12% 75% 13% 
2015-Q4 11 32,238 4115 152,605 15% 73% 12% 
    MEAN 15% 77% 8% 
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Table 15 – Mexico’s debt securities divided by domestic and foreign 
currency from 2000-2015 (Total and percentage) 
Measure A:All currencies 
D:Domestic 
currency 
F:Foreign 
currency 
Domestic 
% 
Foreign 
% 
Quarter      
2000-Q4 85533 2043 83489 2% 98% 
2001-Q4 81030 2206 78824 3% 97% 
2002-Q4 80591 5169 75421 6% 94% 
2003-Q4 71899 6426 65472 9% 91% 
2004-Q4 79623 9685 69937 12% 88% 
2005-Q4 82648 11195 71453 14% 86% 
2006-Q4 84724 11558 73166 14% 86% 
2007-Q4 88886 13842 75045 16% 84% 
2008-Q4 82274 14008 68266 17% 83% 
2009-Q4 93011 13455 79556 14% 86% 
2010-Q4 102203 11948 90255 12% 88% 
2011-Q4 119193 12591 106602 11% 89% 
2012-Q4 144940 15907 129033 11% 89% 
2013-Q4 173263 18398 154865 11% 89% 
2014-Q4 192850 18486 174363 10% 90% 
2015-Q4 209041 21452 187589 11% 89% 
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Table 16 – Debt Securities issued by Venezuela and debt securities issued in 
Bolivar Fuerte from 2000-2015 
SECURITIES ISSUED BY 
VENEZUELA 
TOTAL SECURITIES ISSUED IN 
BOLIVAR FUERTE 
Measure C:Gross 
issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding 
Measure C:Gross 
issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding 
2000-Q4 0 19,167 2000-Q4 0 0 
2001-Q4 724 19,998 2001-Q4 0 0 
2002-Q4 0 19,169 2002-Q4 0 0 
2003-Q4 1,470 19,821 2003-Q4 0 0 
2004-Q4 2,000 21,020 2004-Q4 0 0 
2005-Q4 3,000 25,400 2005-Q4 220 220 
2006-Q4 1 22,217 2006-Q4 492 977 
2007-Q4 1,250 30,303 2007-Q4 786 2,250 
2008-Q4 0 32,754 2008-Q4 0 2,215 
2009-Q4 8,148 42,399 2009-Q4 0 2,033 
2010-Q4 3,216 47,800 2010-Q4 48 530 
2011-Q4 5,394 56,581 2011-Q4 0 271 
2012-Q4 0 56,433 2012-Q4 0 236 
2013-Q4 0 55,299 2013-Q4 0 161 
2014-Q4 0 52,257 2014-Q4 0 161 
2015-Q4 0 49,743 2015-Q4 0 161 
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Table 17 – Venezuela’s debt securities decomposed into Euro and U.S dollar 
from 2000-2015 
 EURO US DOLLARS Composition 
Measure C:Gross issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding 
C:Gross 
issues 
I:Amounts 
outstanding EURO 
US 
DOLLARS OTHER 
2000-Q4 0 1,046 0 18,121 5% 95% 0% 
2001-Q4 224 2,049 500 17,813 10% 89% 1% 
2002-Q4 0 2,438 0 16,582 13% 87% 1% 
2003-Q4 0 2,091 1470 17,563 11% 89% 1% 
2004-Q4 0 2,102 2000 18,746 10% 89% 1% 
2005-Q4 0 2,410 3000 22,838 9% 90% 1% 
2006-Q4 0 2,689 1 19,377 12% 87% 1% 
2007-Q4 0 3,006 1250 27,140 10% 90% 1% 
2008-Q4 0 1,740 0 31,014 5% 95% 0% 
2009-Q4 0 1,801 8148 40,599 4% 96% 0% 
2010-Q4 0 1,670 3216 46,130 3% 97% 0% 
2011-Q4 0 1,294 5394 55,287 2% 98% 0% 
2012-Q4 0 1,319 0 55,113 2% 98% 0% 
2013-Q4 0 1,379 0 53,919 2% 98% 0% 
2014-Q4 0 1,214 0 51,043 2% 98% 0% 
2015-Q4 0 0 0 49,743 0% 100% 0% 
    MEAN 6% 93% 0% 
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Table 18 – Venezuela’s debt securities divided by domestic and foreign 
currency from 2000-2015 (Total and percentage) 
Measure A:All currencies 
D:Domestic 
currency 
F:Foreign 
currency 
Domestic 
% 
Foreign 
% 
2000-Q4 19167 500 18667 3% 97% 
2001-Q4 19998 500 19498 3% 97% 
2002-Q4 19169 500 18669 3% 97% 
2003-Q4 19821 0 19821 0% 100% 
2004-Q4 21020 0 21020 0% 100% 
2005-Q4 25400 0 25400 0% 100% 
2006-Q4 22217 0 22217 0% 100% 
2007-Q4 30303 0 30303 0% 100% 
2008-Q4 32754 0 32754 0% 100% 
2009-Q4 42399 0 42399 0% 100% 
2010-Q4 47800 300 47500 1% 99% 
2011-Q4 56581 300 56281 1% 99% 
2012-Q4 56433 300 56133 1% 99% 
2013-Q4 55299 300 54999 1% 99% 
2014-Q4 52257 650 51607 1% 99% 
2015-Q4 49743 650 49093 1% 99% 
 
